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Abstract: There is a large literature documenting that high host-country corporate taxes deter 
foreign direct investment. However, some recent papers have questioned the robustness of this 
result in developing countries. In this paper we investigate one possible reason: the presence of a 
trade-off between taxes and good governance.  We find that taxes and governance interact and 
that taxes and corruption are substitutes so that the impact of taxes alone on FDI will be lessened 
when corruption is also present.  Bribes and weak tax enforcement tend to reduce formal tax 
payments by more than the bribe, and bribery becomes the more important cost for 
multinationals. Since corruption tends to be more prevalent and tax administration weaker in 
developing countries, this helps explain why in general corporate taxes are less relevant in 
explaining FDI location in the developing world.   The substitutability result also suggests that 
when taxes are high, the impact of corruption on FDI location is lessened. The reason would 
seem to be that when there are excessive taxes, paying a bribe may allow a business to avoid the 
constraints imposed by excessive government, an argument suggested in the previous literature.  
This does not mean that such an economy is more efficient, however; as Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993) argue, bribe payments may be much more distortive and costly than taxation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A large literature has documented the fact that high host-country corporate taxes deter 
foreign direct investment.  In a series of meta-studies De Mooij and Ederveen (2003, 2008) find 
that the average estimated tax elasticity of FDI is -3.3 percent.   Moreover, Altshuler, Grubert 
and Newlon (2001) find the elasticity of investment with respect to after-tax host country rates of 
return for U.S. multinationals increased from 1.5 in 1984 to 2.8 in 1992, and Altshuler and 
Grubert (2004) find evidence of investment tax elasticities increasing over years 1992, 1998 and 
2000.  Summarizing much of the research on the taxation of multinationals, Gordon and Hines 
(2002) state that the “econometric work of the last fifteen years provides ample evidence of the 
sensitivity of the level and location of FDI to its tax treatment.” 
Much of the previous work in this area has concentrated on developed countries.  There 
are, however, some studies of developing countries, surveyed in Madies and Dethier (2010).  
They state (p. 20) “Most empirical studies … conclude that FDI inflows into developing 
countries are sensitive, to various degrees, to corporate income taxation and fiscal incentives.”  
For instance, Hines (2001) finds some evidence that Japanese investment is higher when tax-
sparing agreements relieve the usual tax that would be owed on profits generated in low-tax 
developing countries.   Klemm and van Parys (2009) find that tax incentives help attract FDI in 
their sample of developing countries, but do not increase gross private fixed capital formation or 
growth. 
Yet recent evidence suggests that there really is something different about the corporate 
tax-FDI relationship in developing countries.  For instance, Goodspeed, Martinez-Vazquez, and 
Zhang (2010) find that high host-country corporate taxes negatively affect incoming FDI in host 
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countries that are developed, but not in host countries that are developing.  Dharmapala and 
Hines (2009) find that taxes affect US FDI in well governed but not poorly governed tax havens.  
Fatica (2009) finds that the sensitivity of foreign investment to the tax rate varies with the level 
of host country institutional quality.  Is there something different between developing and 
developed countries that affects the estimated tax elasticity?  Are the results of previous studies 
that concentrate on developed countries, particularly the U.S., or have mixed together developing 
and developed countries, primarily due to the sampling of developed countries?  If so, what 
exactly lies behind the lack of sensitivity of FDI to corporate tax in developing countries? 
Our starting point is the result of Goodspeed, Martinez-Vazquez, and Zhang (2010) that 
FDI entering developing and developed countries reacts differently to corporate taxes.  While 
there are several possible reasons that could explain this result, in this paper we investigate one 
of the possible reasons:  a trade-off between taxes and good governance.  Previous papers have 
found that corruption negatively affects FDI, the first careful studies being those of Wei (2000a, 
2000b), and we also found this in our earlier paper cited above.  Corruption effects may also 
interact with tax effects, however, so the relationship may not be as simple as it first appears.  
And almost no studies investigate the impact of the interaction of corruption and taxation on 
FDI. 
One reason that good governance and taxation could interact is that corruption may be 
interpreted itself as a sort of tax on doing business.  If tax administration in developing countries 
is weak, the more important “tax” in a developing country might be bribery payments or a lack 
of the rule of law.  Formal tax payments to the government might go unpaid without 
consequence if tax administration is weak, while bribery payments may be less easily avoided. In 
principle, bribery payments and tax payments could be substitutes or complements.  If they are 
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complements, bribery payments would be paid in addition to full tax payments.  It seems more 
likely that they are substitutes, however, so that firms would have to pay less than the full tax on 
a combination of bribery and tax payments.  
Consider now how this interaction of bribery and taxation affects FDI. The relationship 
between the two will affect how each alone affects FDI.  If bribery and tax payments are 
substitutes, the impact of each alone on FDI will be lessened when both are present (while the 
impact of each alone on FDI would be strengthened if they are complements).  Take for instance 
the impact of taxes on FDI.  Many studies have found that taxes negatively affect FDI.  But if 
corruption and taxes are substitutes, the presence of corruption should be expected to weaken the 
importance of formal taxation in determining FDI location. That is, the elasticity of FDI to taxes 
would be lower in the presence of corruption and in the extreme it should be zero. This is a 
question that has not been closely examined in the literature.  
By the same token, the impact of corruption on FDI location would also be affected by 
the presence of taxation.  If taxes and corruption are substitutes, the impact of corruption on FDI 
location would be most acute when taxes are low.  Conversely, if taxes are high, the impact of 
corruption on FDI location would not be as important.  The reason could be that in an 
excessively high tax environment, corruption allows multinationals to avoid excessive taxation.  
Interestingly, there is some literature that points in this direction, at least conceptually (e.g. Leff, 
1964; Liu, 1985).  The argument is that when there are excessive taxes, regulations, or 
bureaucratic red tape in setting up a business, paying a bribe may “grease the wheels” and allow 
a business to avoid the constraints imposed by excessive government.  This does not necessarily 
mean that such an economy is more efficient however.  For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) 
argue that bribe payments are actually much more distortive and costly to an economy than tax 
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payments.  Almost no papers examine this relationship between corporate taxes and corruption 
empirically, Wei (2001) being the exception.  He finds negative effects of both taxes and 
corruption on FDI but no evidence of an interaction. 
Our findings indicate that there is a trade-off between taxes and good governance.  We 
find that taxes and corruption are substitutes so that the impact of taxes alone on FDI will be 
lessened when corruption is also present.  Bribes and weak tax enforcement tend to reduce 
formal tax payments by more than the bribe and bribery becomes the more important cost for 
multinationals. Since corruption tends to be more prevalent and tax administration weaker in 
developing countries, this helps explain why in general corporate taxes are less relevant in 
explaining FDI location in the developing world.   The substitutability result also suggests that 
when taxes are high, the impact of corruption on FDI location is lessened. The reason would 
seem to be that when there are excessive taxes, paying a bribe may allow a business to avoid the 
constraints imposed by excessive government, an argument suggested in previous literature.  
This does not mean that such an economy is more efficient, however; as Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993) argue, bribe payments may be much more distortive and costly than taxation. 
II. DATA DESCRIPTION 
Our main objective in this paper is to empirically explore a possible reason for our earlier 
finding that corporate taxes are important for FDI going to developed countries, but not 
developing countries.  The explanation that we explore is that taxes and corruption are viewed as 
substitutes by multinationals.  We will use a panel data set of 25 developing and 27 developed 
destination countries from 1985-2002.  Source countries consist of OECD countries.  For our 
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dependent variable we use the OECD bilateral data on the (log of) FDI stock of destination 
country i in year t coming from OECD source country j.   
We follow the previous literature and include variables that have been consistently found 
in the past to be determinants of FDI for our control variables:  distance, population, GDP, the 
unemployment rate, and exports; this last variable, exports, is lagged to try to correct for 
potential endogeneity.  The distance between countries is suggested by the gravity equation as a 
determinant of FDI. The unemployment rate controls for business cycle effects.  Population is a 
proxy for market size, which other things equal should attract more FDI.  Exports control for the 
openness of an economy.  Holding population constant, GDP is a measure of wealth and can be 
roughly interpreted as controlling for the return on investment or marginal product of capital.  
Generally, poorer countries lack capital and hence should be expected to have a higher return on 
investment than wealthier countries, other things equal, which implies an inverse relationship 
between GDP and FDI.  We also include a source country dummy to control for any observable 
or unobservable source country factors that affect FDI and that do not vary over time.  
Our corporate tax variable is computed as the minimum of: (i) the effective tax rate faced 
by US multinationals calculated using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and 
(ii) the statutory tax rate from data from the Office of Tax Policy Research (OTPR).   The idea of 
this variable is that the statutory tax rate may be too high because of depreciation allowances, tax 
holidays, and so forth that are granted by the host country.  The effective tax rate we use – (i) 
above - is a simple measure of foreign taxes paid in the host country divided by profits; if it is 
lower than the statutory rate, we take this measure which helps to more accurately reflect the true 
tax burden.  This measure is also used by Hines and Rice (1994) and Dharmapala and Hines 
(2009).  We also lag our tax variable to try to correct for any endogeneity. 
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We use two different measures of good governance.   The first is a measure of corruption, 
the “Corruption Perception Index” from Transparency International.  This index is one that is 
commonly used (one of the measures used by Wei (2000a, 2000b) for instance) and is the 
measure that we can find that has the most coverage for the countries in our sample.  This index 
ranges in value between 0 and 10.  It uses a higher number for less corruption so in our empirical 
work we subtract the index from 10 in order to ease the interpretation. 
Our second measure of good governance is the somewhat different “rule of law” index of 
Kaufmann, et al. (2009).  This measure is designed to measure “perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence.”  (p. 6) This measure is somewhat different from pure corruption – it deals 
more with property rights.  It is available only every two years during our sample period so that 
our sample size is smaller for this measure. 
We should note that observations for the tax rate and the good governance measures are 
available for varying numbers of years and countries.  In all, 52 (25 developing and 27 
developed) countries are covered for the tax rate for the years 1985 to 2002.  The time span is 
shorter for our other variables.  The corruption index covers 47 countries from 1995 to 2002.  
The rule of law index covers all the 52 countries, but only for the years 1996, 1998, 2000 and 
2002.   We limit our regressions to include countries and years for which all relevant information 
is available. The list of the countries covered, their development status, the definition and 
sources of our variables, and summary statistics are presented in Tables A-1, A-2, and A-3 in the 
Appendix. 
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III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
  Our primary purpose is to explore whether taxes and good governance are viewed as 
substitutes by multinationals in their foreign investment decisions.  To do this, we investigate 
three specifications below.  The first specification is designed to set the stage.  Here we will 
allow the coefficient on the tax rate to vary between developed and developing countries: 
ijt 0 1 2 3
4 5 6
Log FDI   Dev _ Dum  Year _ Dum  Source _ Dum
(1)
 Tax  Governance   Tax *Dev _ Dum  Controls  u  
i t j
ijt ijt ijt n nijt ijt
   
   
   
    
 
where FDIijt is the stock of FDI in destination country i coming from source country j in year t, 
Dev_Dumi represents a developing/developed country dummy, Year_Dumt  represents a year 
dummy, Source_ Dumj represents a dummy for the source country, Taxijt represents the effective 
corporate tax rate, Governance is a measure of governance (either bad governance - the 
corruption perception index - or good governance - the rule of law index) and Controlsnijt 
represents control variable n. 
A main finding from our first specification is that the marginal impact of taxes on the 
stock of FDI differs depending on whether the host country is developed or developing.  Our 
second specification investigates one possible explanation.  It allows for an interaction effect 
between governance and taxes, but does not allow the coefficients to vary between developed 
and developing countries.  It is similar to (1) above, but has an interaction between governance 
and the effective corporate tax rate and does not have a developing country dummy: 
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Our third specification investigates this further by asking whether any interaction between 
governance and taxes differs between developing and developed countries.  The third 
specification adds a triple interaction of governance, the developing dummy, and the tax rate, 
adds each of these variables individually, and adds a full set of double interaction terms: 
 
In all specifications, the semi-log specification implies a non-linear, exponential relationship 
between the stock of FDI and the explanatory variables.  The pooled nature of the data can create 
a downward bias in the standard errors due to repeated cross-sections (leading to unwarranted 
significance of coefficients).  We therefore present clustered standard errors, which allows for an 
arbitrary correlation in the errors of the cluster (source-destination pair in our case) for all our 
regressions. 
 Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present our results.  Table 3.1 presents results for our three 
specifications using the corruption perception index of Transparency International.  Table 3.2 
presents the results using the rule of law measure. 
We begin with Table 3.1.  The first column presents results with the tax rate, the 
corruption perception index, the tax rate interacted with the a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one for developing countries and zero for developed countries, and our control variables 
ijt 0 1 2
3 4 5
Log FDI   Year _ Dum  Source _ Dum
(2)
 Tax  Governance   Tax*Governance  Controls  u  
t j
ijt ijt ijt n nijt ijt
  
   
  
    
ijt 0 1 2 3
4 5 6
7 8
9
Log FDI   Dev _ Dum  Year _ Dum  Source _ Dum
 Tax  Governance   Tax*Governance  
(3)
 Tax*Dev _ Dum  Governance *Dev _ Dum
 Tax*Governance*Dev _ Dum  Controls  
i t j
ijt ijt ijt
ijt ijt ijt
ijt n nijt
   
  
 
 
   
  
 
   uijt
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(including the dummy for developed countries as an intercept shifter).  Except for unemployment 
and the dummy for a developing country, all of our control variables are significant.  Population 
has a positive sign, indicating that a larger market attracts FDI.  GDP has a negative sign which 
we interpret as controlling for the marginal product of capital or return on investment.  Exports, 
interpreted as controlling for openness, are positively related to FDI.  Distance has a negative 
relation to FDI as suggested by the gravity equation. 
 The first thing to note is the highly significant and negative effect of taxes on FDI for 
developed countries, but not for developing countries.  Note that the specification includes not 
only the tax rate, but also its interaction with a developing country dummy, which takes on the 
value one if a country is developing and zero if the country is developed.  Thus, the coefficient 
on the tax rate is that for developed countries.  Evaluating the coefficient of -.034 at the sample 
mean tax rate of 31 percent yields an elasticity of FDI to the tax rate of about -1 for developed 
countries.  That is, a one percent rise in the tax rate decreases FDI by about one percent for 
developed countries.  For developing countries the coefficient is much lower; adding the 
coefficient on the interaction term yields a coefficient for developing countries of only .012.  
Moreover, the standard error associated with this coefficient implies that the point estimate is not 
significantly different from zero for developing countries.  Hence, these results reconfirm the 
findings of Goodspeed, Martinez-Vazquez, and Zhang (2010) that host country corporate taxes 
affect FDI going to developed but not developing countries.  
The second thing to note about the column one results is the significant negative effect of 
host country corruption on incoming FDI.  Evaluating the coefficient of -.111 at the mean 
corruption value of 4.1 yields an elasticity of FDI with respect to the corruption measure of  
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-0.45.  That is, a ten percent rise in the corruption index yields a fall in FDI of 4.5 percent.  This 
implies that corruption deters FDI, and is consistent with the hypothesis that corruption itself is a 
type of tax. 
There remains a question about why FDI entering developing countries seems to react 
less to host country corporate taxes.  As noted above, one possibility is that taxes and corruption 
interact.  If corruption is viewed by multinationals as a tax on doing business, and if tax 
administration in developing countries is weak, the more important “tax” in a developing country 
might be bribery payments.  Moreover, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that bribe payments are 
actually much more distortive and costly to an economy than tax payments. 
 Column 2 begins to assess this argument by interacting the tax rate with the corruption 
index instead of the developing country dummy.  The result is a positive and significant 
coefficient, suggesting that companies that invest in foreign countries do in fact view corruption 
and bribery to some extent as substitutes.  Host country corruption has a greater impact on FDI 
when taxes are low, and host country taxes have a greater impact on FDI when corruption is low.  
If taxes are zero, the corruption coefficient is -.206 (doubling the elasticity implied by column 
one), while it is -.08 evaluated at the mean tax rate of 31 in the sample (slightly reducing the 
elasticity implied by column one).  If corruption is zero, the tax coefficient is -.042, somewhat 
higher than in column one, while if corruption is its maximum in the sample, the tax coefficient 
is close to zero. 
 Column two thus supports the proposition that taxes and corruption are substitutes.  This 
suggests that the result that host corporate taxes do not affect FDI entering developing countries 
is due to corruption in developing countries, combined perhaps with weak tax administration.  
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However, there may be other reasons that developing countries are different.  To test this, 
column three adds a triple interaction of corruption, the tax rate, and the developing country 
dummy, along with double interactions of the tax rate and corruption, the developing dummy and 
the tax rate, and the developing dummy and corruption.  
We begin the discussion of column three by focusing on the tax rate.  The interaction of 
corruption with the tax rate is insignificant in column three, so the coefficient on the tax rate of -
.0364 is that for developed countries.  Moreover the coefficient is not significantly different from 
that of column one.  The coefficient for developing countries involves several terms: -.0364 - 
.0989 (from the tax rate-developing dummy interaction) + .00117*corruption (from the tax rate-
corruption interaction) + .0175*corruption (from the triple interaction).  Evaluating at the mean 
corruption value for developing countries of 6.5 and adding together yields a coefficient of -.014 
for developing countries.  This is consistent with the findings of column one, but give a more 
nuanced picture: developing countries with low corruption may indeed find that taxes are an 
important factor in FDI location. 
Turning to the coefficient on corruption in column three, the value for developed 
countries is -.149 since the interaction of corruption and the tax rate is insignificant and the value 
for the developing country dummy is zero.   This is somewhat higher than the estimate for 
column one.  For developing countries, the estimate is -.149 - .336 (from the corruption-
developing dummy interaction) + .00117*tax rate (from the tax rate-corruption interaction) + 
.0175*tax rate (from the triple interaction). Adding together yields a coefficient of -.485 + 
.0187*tax rate for developing countries.  This is a striking result.  If tax rates are low in the host 
country, then corruption indeed lowers host country FDI.  However, as the tax rate rises, the 
impact of corruption becomes smaller.  Indeed, if tax rates are very high, corruption actually 
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leads to higher FDI in developing countries.  The explanation would appear to be that with 
excessive corporate taxation, corruption allows multinationals to avoid the high taxes, thus 
increasing FDI. 
An alternative variable to the corruption perception index is the “rule of law” measure of 
Kaufmann et al. (2009).    Table 3.2 presents these results, which by and large the results are 
similar to the results of Table 3.1, although the coefficients in the specification with the triple 
interaction have less statistical significance. 
We begin by discussing the results for column one.  All control variables have the same 
sign as in Table 3.1, and all are significant, including unemployment which was insignificant in 
the earlier table.  The coefficient on the corporate tax rate is that for developed countries and is 
negative and significant, with a slightly higher coefficient of -.041, and a correspondingly higher 
elasticity estimate of about -1.25.  The estimate for developing countries is .0171 – a positive 
number that may at first be puzzling.  However, considering the findings of columns two and 
three of Table 3.1 (that corruption and taxes in fact interact), this could reflect a similar 
phenomenon with respect to taxes and the rule of law.  The coefficient on the rule of law is 
positive and significant – greater respect for property rights increases FDI.  The elasticity of FDI 
with respect to the rule of law evaluated at the mean is close to 2. 
Column two of Table 3.2 uses an interaction of the tax rate with the rule of law instead of 
column one’s interaction of the tax rate with a developing country dummy.  As in Table 3.1, 
there is a significant interaction effect suggesting that the rule of law and corporate taxes are 
viewed as substitutes by multinational firms.  When the rule of law is high, the corporate tax 
deters FDI, but at low rule of law levels, the corporate tax rate actually has a positive effect on 
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FDI.  Evaluated at the mean rule of law value of developing countries, the coefficient on the 
corporate tax rate is very close to zero (.004).  Evaluating at the mean rule of law value of 
developed countries, the coefficient on the corporate tax rate is -.038, close to the value 
estimated in column one of Table 3.2 as well as the estimates from Table 3.1.  The results of 
column two thus support the result that FDI responds to corporate taxes in developed but not 
developing countries.  The mechanism suggested by this column is that the rule of law interacts 
with the tax rate and when it is low (as it is generally in developing countries), the marginal 
impact of corporate taxes on FDI location is blunted. 
The coefficient of the rule of law in column two is positive and significant, but its impact 
is reduced as the corporate tax rate rises.  If the corporate tax rate were zero, the elasticity of FDI 
and the rule of law would be almost 3.4 evaluated at the mean value for the rule of law.  
However,  as the corporate tax rate rises, the elasticity falls.  The elasticity of FDI and the rule of 
law falls to 2.6 when the tax rate is at its mean in the sample (31.4 percent).   This result is 
similar to the result of Table 3.1 with respect to corruption: when corporate taxes become 
excessively high, marginal improvements in property rights have less of an impact on FDI 
location. 
The final column of Table 3.2 adds the triple interaction term as well as double 
interaction terms. The rule of law is positive and significant and the interaction of the rule of law 
and the tax rate is negative, but not significant.  The rule of law interacted with the developing 
country dummy is negative and significant, but the triple interaction term is insignificant.  As 
many of the interaction terms are insignificant, this column reveals less, but it suggests a high 
elasticity of FDI and the rule of law for developed countries (5.3), with a somewhat lower but 
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still relatively high elasticity for developing countries (1.5).  These results seem to confirm the 
importance of the rule of law in both developed and developing countries.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
There is a large literature documenting that high host-country corporate taxes deter 
foreign direct investment. However, some recent papers have questioned the robustness of this 
result in developing countries. These include our own work (Goodspeed, Martinez-Vazquez, and 
Zhang, 2010) where we find that host country taxes affect FDI entering developed but not 
developing countries; Dharmapala and Hines (2009) who find that taxes affect US FDI in well 
governed but not poorly governed tax havens; and Fatica (2009) who finds that the sensitivity of 
foreign investment to the tax rate varies with the level of host country institutional quality. 
In this paper we investigate one of the possible reasons for a weaker relationship between 
corporate taxes and FDI in developing countries: the presence of a trade-off between taxes and 
corruption.  Although some previous papers have documented a negative impact of corruption on 
FDI, little work has been done on how governance may interact with taxes. In this paper we 
hypothesize that the presence of corruption weakens the impact of corporate taxes in determining 
FDI flows because bribes and weak tax enforcement tend to reduce formal tax payments, and 
bribery becomes the more important cost for multinationals. Since corruption tends to be more 
prevalent and tax administration weaker in developing countries, this helps explain why in 
general corporate taxes are less relevant in explaining FDI location in the developing world.  
We explore the interaction of corporate taxes, governance, and developing countries 
using several empirical specifications. First, we allow the coefficient for the tax rate to vary 
between developed and developing countries; the second  specification allows for an interaction 
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effect between governance and taxes, but does not allow the coefficients to vary between 
developed and developing countries; the third and final specification adds a triple interaction of 
governance, the developing dummy, and the corporate tax rate, in addition to including each of 
these variables individually and a full set of double interaction terms.  We use two measures of 
governance in our specifications, one a corruption index and the other a rule of law measure. 
In our estimations we find with the first specification a highly significant and negative 
effect of taxes on FDI for developed countries, but not for developing countries, and a separate 
individual significant negative effect of host country corruption and positive effect of the rule of 
law on incoming FDI.  In the second specification, an interaction of the tax rate with corruption 
instead of the developing country dummy yields a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting 
that foreign investors view taxation and bribery to some extent as substitutes.  Host country 
corruption has a greater impact on FDI when taxes are low, and host country taxes have a greater 
impact on FDI when corruption is low. This suggests that part of the explanation of our previous 
finding that host country corporate taxes do not affect FDI entering developing countries is that 
corporate taxes and corruption are acting as substitutes in developing countries.  Our results with 
respect to the rule of law indicate that the same reasoning would explain the Dharmapala and 
Hines result that low taxes in tax havens affect FDI if the tax haven is well governed but not if 
the tax haven is poorly governed. 
Since there may be other reasons for the response of FDI to corporate taxes in developing 
countries, in the third specification we add the triple interaction of corruption, the tax rate, and 
the developing country dummy, along with double interactions of the tax rate and corruption, the 
developing dummy and the tax rate, and the developing dummy and corruption. What we find is 
that if tax rates are low in the host country, then corruption indeed lowers host country FDI.  
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However, as the tax rate rises, the impact of corruption becomes smaller.  Indeed, if tax rates are 
very high, corruption actually leads to higher FDI.  The explanation would appear to be that with 
high levels of formal taxation, corruption allows foreign investment to avoid the excessively high 
taxes, thus increasing FDI. And this latter could only be true if one dollar of bribes “saved” more 
than one dollar of taxes. Corrupt practices in the developing world, but also in general, would 
seem to support this inference: corrupt tax officials generally are willing to accept a fraction of 
the due but otherwise forgone tax payment as the bribe. Given the potential legal risk associated 
with bribes, risk-averse foreign investors, acting at their own discretion, would accept the 
alternative of bribes over tax payments only if the price for the bribe option is highly discounted. 
But the result is likely to be more costly for the host economy along the lines argued by Shleifer 
and Vishny (1993).  
From a political economy viewpoint our results may help explain why it is still common 
to find tax codes in developing countries with high statutory corporate tax rates. Keeping those 
rates high may protect the interests of corrupt tax officials in developing deals with foreign 
investors. However, some of those rents are likely diminished with the introduction of formal tax 
holidays and incentives. 
 
  
18                                                   International Studies Program Working Paper Series 
 
Table 3.1 
FDI, Taxes, and Corruption 
(Corruption perception index measure) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Dependent Variable: Log (FDI stock) 
Corporate 
effective tax rate 
-0.0340*** 
(0.00619) 
-0.0421*** 
(0.00952) 
-0.0364*** 
(0.0106) 
    
Corruption -0.111*** -0.206*** -0.149* 
 (0.0317) (0.0551) (0.0869) 
    
Corruption*tax 
rate 
 0.00409** 
(0.00199) 
0.00117 
(0.00310) 
    
Tax rate* 
developing 
dummy 
0.0218** 
(0.0105) 
 -0.0989** 
(0.0503) 
    
Corruption* 
developing 
dummy 
  -0.336* 
(0.188) 
    
Corruption* 
developing 
dummy*tax rate 
  0.0175** 
(0.00789) 
    
Developing 
dummy 
-0.476 
(0.337) 
 1.876  
(1.177) 
Unemployment 0.0174 0.0150 0.0167 
 (0.0132) (0.0129) (0.0132) 
Population 4.26e-06* 4.64e-06* 4.90e-06* 
 (2.57e-06) (2.50e-06) (2.58e-06) 
GDP -3.05e-07*** -3.25e-07*** -3.08e-07*** 
 (1.13e-07) (1.11e-07) (1.13e-07) 
Exports (lagged) 6.38e-06*** 6.36e-06*** 6.39e-06*** 
 (6.79e-07) (6.73e-07) (6.77e-07) 
Distance -0.000114*** -0.000112*** -0.000116*** 
 (1.52e-05) (1.40e-05) (1.53e-05) 
Constant 10.58*** 10.78*** 10.47*** 
 (0.246) (0.281) (0.311) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Source Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4108 4108 4108 
R-squared 0.711 0.709 0.712 
Clustered and robust standard errors in parentheses 
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3.2 
FDI, Taxes, and Rule of law 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Dependent Variable: Log (FDI stock) 
Corporate 
effective tax rate 
-0.0411*** 
(0.00605) 
0.0656*** 
(0.0209) 
0.0633 
(0.0636) 
    
Rule of law 0.609*** 1.064*** 1.647*** 
 (0.129) (0.161) (0.489) 
    
Rule of law* tax 
rate 
 
 -0.0258*** 
(0.00566) 
-0.0244 
(0.0155) 
Tax rate* 
developing 
dummy 
0.0582*** 
(0.0107) 
 -0.0380 
(0.0751) 
    
Rule of law* 
developing 
dummy 
  -1.172* 
(0.628) 
   0.0176 
Rule of law* tax 
rate* developing 
dummy 
  (0.0225) 
    
Developing 
dummy 
-1.021*** 
(0.344) 
 3.868* 
(2.281) 
Unemployment 0.0292** 0.0245* 0.0283* 
 (0.0140) (0.0138) (0.0145) 
Population 8.71e-06*** 8.79e-06*** 7.53e-06*** 
 (2.77e-06) (2.77e-06) (2.80e-06) 
GDP -3.23e-07*** -3.52e-07*** -3.48e-07*** 
 (1.17e-07) (1.16e-07) (1.17e-07) 
Exports (lagged) 6.51e-06*** 6.53e-06*** 6.73e-06*** 
 (6.82e-07) (6.74e-07) (7.02e-07) 
Distance -0.000110*** -0.000106*** -0.000106*** 
 (1.44e-05) (1.41e-05) (1.45e-05) 
Constant 7.809*** 5.924*** 3.302 
 (0.614) (0.694) (2.094) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Source Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2186 2186 2186 
R-squared 0.712 0.707 0.712 
Notes: Clustered and robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 
Table A-1 
Sample Countries (* indicates developing) 
 
1 *Argentina 27 Italy 
2 Australia 28 *Jamaica 
3 Austria 29 Japan 
4 *Barbados 30 Korea, Republic of 
5 Belgium 31 Luxembourg 
6 *Brazil 32 *Malaysia 
7 Canada 33 *Mexico 
8 *Chile 34 Netherlands 
9 *China 35 New Zealand 
10 *Colombia 36 Norway 
11 *Costa Rica 37 *Panama 
12 Denmark 38 *Peru 
13 *Dominican Republic 39 *Philippines 
14 *Ecuador 40 Portugal 
15 *Egypt 41 *Saudi Arabia 
16 Finland 42 Singapore 
17 France 43 Spain 
18 Germany 44 Sweden 
19 Greece 45 Switzerland 
20 *Guatemala 46 *Thailand 
21 *Honduras 47 *Trinidad and Tobago 
22 Hong Kong 48 *Turkey 
23 *India 49 United Arab Emirates 
24 *Indonesia 50 United Kingdom 
25 Ireland 51 United States 
26 Israel 52 *Venezuela 
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Table A-2  
Data Sources 
 
  
 
Variable 
Further explanation Source Years 
FDI FDI stocks Bilateral OECD Data  1985-2002 
Population  In 10,000s 
World Development 
Indicator (WDI) 2006 
1985-2002 
GDP  In Current Dollars 
World Development 
Indicator (WDI) 2006 
1985-2002 
Exports Goods and services World Bank 1985-2002 
Tax Rate 
The minimum of the BEA tax 
rate and statutory tax rate, where 
BEA tax rate= foreign income 
taxes/(foreign income tax + net 
income) of all affiliates for U.S. 
firms operating abroad in each 
country and year 
Calculated with data 
from Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
(BEA) and OTPR for 
statutory rate 
1985-2002 
Corruption 
Perception Index  
Ranges from 0-10, with 10 
denoting least corrupt, 
transformed by subtracting from 
10 for ease of interpretation 
Transparency 
International 
1995-2002 
Rule of Law 
One of the six governance 
indicators from the Aggregate 
Governance Indicators 1996-
2008. Ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, 
transformed to 0 to 5, with higher 
values corresponding to better 
governance outcomes. 
Daniel Kaufmann, 
Aart Kraay and 
Massimo 
Mastruzzi,2003-
2009，Daniel 
Kaufmann, Aart 
Kraay and Pablo 
Zoido-Lobaton 
(1999). 
Biannual data 
for 1996-
2002, and 
annual data 
for 2003-
2008 
Distance 
Distance between capital cities of 
two countries 
CEPII 
Constant 
over years 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Total unemployment rate, % of 
total unemployed in total labor 
force 
World Development 
Indicator (WDI) 2006 
1985-2002 
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 Table A-3  
Summary of statistics 
  
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. 
    
FDI Stock 9254 4171.381 15060.85 
Tax Rate 26136 31.3557 18.23711 
Corruption Perception Index 9546 4.09793 2.533594 
Rule of Law 5920 3.206807 0.957981 
Unemployment 23060 7.838019 4.780108 
Export 22710 72579.22 105246.5 
Population 26640 7465.116 20423.11 
GDP 26640 432743.4 1136175 
Distance 26640 7312.026 4729.527 
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